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Abstract—Rijndael algorithm was unanimously chosen as 
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) by the panel of 
researchers at National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) in October 2000. Since then, Rijndael 
was destined to be used massively in various software as 
well as hardware entities for encrypting data. However, a 
few years back, Daniel Bernstein [2] devised a cache-
timing attack that was capable enough to break Rijndael’s 
seal that encapsulates the encryption key. In this paper, 
we propose a new Dynamic Cache Flushing (DCF) 
algorithm which shows a set of pragmatic software 
measures that would make Rijndael impregnable to cache 
timing attack. The simulation results demonstrate that the 
proposed DCF algorithm provides better security by 
encrypting key at a constant time. 
Keywords- dynamic cache flushing, Rijndael 
algorithm, timing attack. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Rijndael is a block cipher adopted as an encryption 
standard by the U.S. government. It has been analyzed 
extensively and is now used widely worldwide as was 
the case with its predecessor, the Data Encryption 
Standard (DES). Rijndael, the AES standard is currently 
used in various fields. Due to its impressive efficiency 
[8], it’s being used in high-speed optical networks, it’s 
used in military applications that encrypt top secret data, 
and it’s used in banking and financial applications 
wherein secured and real-time transfer of data is a top-
priority.  
Microsoft has embraced Rijndael and implemented 
Rijndael in its much talked about DotNet (.NET) 
Framework. DotNet 3.5 has Rijndael implementation in 
System.Security.Cryptography namespace. DotNet 
framework is used by millions of developers around the 
world to develop software applications in numerous 
fields. In other words, software implementation of 
Rijndael is touching almost all the fields that 
implements cryptography through the DotNet 
framework.       
Wireless Network Security has no exception. Wired 
Equivalent Privacy (WEP) is the protocol used in 
wireless networks to ensure secure environment. When 
WEP is turned on in a wireless network, every packet of 
data that is transmitted from one station to another is 
first encrypted using Rijndael algorithm by taking the 
packets’ data payload and a secret encryption key called 
WEP key. The encrypted data is then broadcasted to 
stations registered on that wireless network. At the 
receiving end, the “wireless network aware stations” 
utilize the WEP key to decrypt data using Rijndael 
algorithm. Rijndael supports a larger range of block and 
key sizes; AES has a fixed block size of 128 bits and a 
key size of 128, 192 or 256 bits, whereas Rijndael can 
be specified with key and block sizes in any multiple of 
32 bits, with a minimum of 128 bits and a maximum of 
256 bits [6]. 
This algorithm implements the input, output, and 
cipher key where each of the bit sequences may contain 
128, 192 or 256 bits with the condition that the input and 
output sequences have the same length. However, this 
algorithm provides the basic framework to make the 
code scalable. Look up tables have been used to make 
Rijndael algorithm faster and operations are performed 
on a two dimensional array of bytes called states. State 
consists of 4 rows of bytes, each of which contains Nb 
bytes, where Nb is the input sequence length divided by 
32. During the start or end phase of an encryption or 
decryption operation, the bytes of the cipher input or 
output are copied from or to this state array.  
The several operations that are implemented in this 
algorithm are listed below [9]: 
 
•  Key Schedule: It is an array of 32-bit words that is 
initialized from the cipher key. The cipher iterates 
through a number of the cycles or rounds, each of 
which uses Nk words from the key schedule. This is 
considered as an array of round keys, each containing 
Nk words. 
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• Finite Field Operations: In this algorithm finite field 
operations are carried out, which refers to operations 
performed in the finite field resulting in an element 
within that field. Finite field operations such as 
addition and multiplication, inverse multiplication, 
multiplications using tables and repeated shifts are 
performed. 
 
• Rounds: At the start of the cipher the input is copied 
into the internal state. An initial round key is then 
added and the state is then transformed by iterating a 
round function in a number of cycles. On completion 
the final state is copied into the cipher output [1]. 
 
The round function is parameterized using a key 
schedule that consists of a one dimensional array of 32-
bit words for which the lowest 4, 6 or 8 words are 
initialized with the cipher. There are several steps 
carried out during this operation: 
 
SubBytes: As shown in Fig. 1, it is a non-linear 
substitution step where each of the byte replaces with 
another according to a lookup table. 
 
ShiftRows: This is a transposition step where each row 
of the state is shifted cyclically a certain number of 
steps, as shown in Fig. 2. 
 MixColumns: This is a mixing operation which 
operates on the columns of the state, combining the four 
bytes in each column, as shown in Fig. 3. 
 
AddRoundKey: Here each byte of the state is combined 
with the round key; each round key is derived from the 
cipher key using a key schedule [1], as shown in Fig. 4. 
 
• Final Round: The final round consists of the same 
operations as in the Round function except the 
MixColumns operation. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Parallelism or Parallel Computing has become a 
key aspect of high performance computing today and its 
fundamental advantages have deeply influenced modern 
processor designers. It has become a dominant paradigm 
in processor architecture in form of multicore processors 
available in personal computers today. Sharing 
processor resources like cache memory, sharing memory 
maps in random access memory (RAM) and sharing 
computational power of the math coprocessors during 
execution of multiple processes in the operating 
systems, has become an inevitable phenomenon. Few 
years back, Intel introduced hyper-threading technology 
in its Pentium 4 processors, wherein the sharing of 
processor resources between process threads is extended 
further by sharing memory caches. Shared access to 
memory cache is a feature that’s available in all the 
latest processors from Intel and AMD Athlon. 
With all the hunky-dory talk about how parallel 
computing has made Central Processing Unit’s (CPUs) 
very powerful today, the fundamentals of sharing 
memory cache across the thread boundary has come 
along opening doors for security vulnerabilities. The 
shared memory cache can permit malicious threads of a 
spy process to monitor execution of another thread that 
implements Rijndael, allowing attackers to brute force 
the encryption key [6, 7]. 
 
III. PROBLEM IN RIJNDAEL: CACHE TIMING ATTACK 
Cache timing attack – the name speaks for itself. This 
belongs to a pattern of attacks that concentrates on 
monitoring the target cryptosystem, and analyzing the 
time taken to execute various steps in the cryptographic 
algorithm. In other words, the attack exploits the facts 
that every step in the algorithm takes a certain time to 
 
 
 
Figure 1. SubBytes 
 
 
 
Figure 2. ShiftRows 
 
 
Figure 3. MixColumn 
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execute. 
Although, the cache-timing attack is well-known 
theoretically, but it was only until April 2005 that a stout 
researcher named Daniel Bernstein [2, 4] published that 
the weakness of Rijndael can reveal timing information 
that eventually can be utilized to crack the encryption 
key. In his paper, Daniel announced a successful cache 
timing attack by exploiting the timing characteristics of 
the table lookups. 
Here is the simplest conceivable timing attack on 
Rijndael. AES software implementations like Rijndael 
that uses look-up tables to perform internal operations of 
the cipher, such as Sboxes, are the one that are most 
vulnerable to this attack. For example, the variable-
index array lookup T0[k[0]  n[0]] near the beginning 
of the AES computation. A typical hacker might think 
that the time for this array lookup depends on the array 
index and the time for the whole AES computation is 
well correlated with the time for this array lookup. As a 
result, the AES timings leak information about k[0]  
n[0] and it can calculate the exact value of k[0] from the 
distribution of AES timings as a function of n[0]. 
Similar comments apply to k[1]  n[1], k[2]  n[2], 
etc. Assume, that the hacker watches the time taken by 
the victim to handle many n's and totals the AES times 
for each possible n[13], and observes that the overall 
AES time is maximum when n[13] is, say, 147. Suppose 
that the hacker also observes, by carrying out 
experiments with known keys k on a computer with the 
same AES software and the same CPU, that the overall 
AES time is maximum when k[13]  n[13] is, say, 8. 
The hacker concludes that the victim's key k[13] is 
147  8 = 155. This implies that a hacker can easily 
attack a variable time AES algorithm and can crack the 
encrypted data and eventually key [2]. 
Since in Rijndael algorithm all look up tables are 
stored in the cache, by putting another thread or some 
different way, attacker can easily get the encrypted data 
from the cache. Fig.1 shows that AES implementation in 
OpenSSL which does not take constant time. This was 
taken on a Pentium M processor. It is a 128 x 128 array 
of blocks where X axis shows one key for each row of 
blocks and Y axis shows one input for each column of 
blocks. Any combination of (key, Input) pair shows the 
encryption process for that particular pair by indicating 
the fix pattern of colors at that place. We can see the 
tremendous variability among blocks in Fig. 5. Due to 
this variability, attacker can easily determine the weak 
point, where the encryption took place by just analyzing 
the color pattern. 
The cache timing attack problem has been tackled 
through various approaches [3]. Each solution has its 
own pros and cons. For instance, Intel released a set of 
compilers targeting their latest 64-bit processors. These 
compilers would take the C++ code as input and output 
a set of machine instructions that would not use CPU 
cache at all. In other words, the resultant code has a 
machine instruction that does not use CPU cache for 
temporary storage of data, in other words the cache is 
disabled automatically. 
The other suggestion was to place all the lookup 
tables in CPU registers rather than CPU cache, but this 
would affect performance significantly. Hardware 
approaches are also being considered. It has been 
suggested to have a parallel Field-Programmable Gate 
Array (FPGA) implementation or Application-Specific 
Integrated Circuits (ASIC) implementation with a 
separate coprocessor functioning with the existing CPU. 
This special coprocessor would contain special logical 
circuitry that would implement Rijndael. Timing attack 
can thus be avoided by barring other processes from 
accessing the special coprocessor [5].  
 
 
Figure 5. Open SSL AES timings for 128 keys and 128 inputs on a 
Pentium M processor 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. AddRoundKey 
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IV. PROPOSED DYNAMIC CACHE FLUSHING (DCF) 
ALGORITHM 
Numerous attempts have been made to address the 
timing attack loophole in AES. After a deep analysis of 
the logical steps involved in the Rijndael algorithm, we 
propose a novel technique to improvise the existing 
Rijndael algorithm. Our proposed algorithm follows 
variable-time AES algorithm by replacing it with a 
constant-time (but not high-speed) AES algorithm 
known as DCF (Dynamic Cache Flushing). Here, 
constant means totally independent of the AES key and 
input. The resulting DCF algorithm would be capable 
enough to stand strong against the timing attacks. 
In order to determine the constant-time, first we need 
to collect timings and then look for input-dependent 
patterns. For example, we can repeatedly measure the 
time taken by AES for once (key; input) pair, convert 
the distribution of timings into a small block of colors, 
and then repeat the same color pattern for many keys 
and inputs.  
A constant-time AES algorithm would have the same 
block of colors for every key and input pair, as shown in 
Fig 2. Fig 2 is a 128 x 128 array of blocks. Here, X axis 
indicates the key for each row of blocks and Y axis 
shows the input for each column of blocks. The pattern 
of colors in a block reflects the distribution of timings 
for that (Key; Input) pair. Here, for all (Key, Input) 
pairs, the color patterns remains the same, due to the 
constant time. Hence, attacker cannot easily figure out at 
which point of time the encryption of key and data took 
place. DCF algorithm generates keys at a constant rate 
on today's popular dual-core CPUs. 
A. Description of the Proposed DCF Algorithm 
The DCF algorithm is the improved version of 
Rijndael. In other words, the basic 
encryption/decryption process would remain unchanged. 
However, there are few additional steps injected into the 
Rijndael algorithm that would make it resilient to cache-
timing attack. 
DCF algorithm – as the name rightly suggests, flushes 
cache while the encryption of data is in progress. In 
other words, the data that is being copied by the 
program into the CPU cache during the 
encryption/decryption process is removed at periodic 
intervals. The major advantage of doing this is that, 
during a cache-timing attack, the spy process tries to tap 
the data stored in look up tables in the CPU cache. Since 
each instruction takes time to encrypt or decrypt the 
data, attacker can break the data by just taking 
difference of collected large body of timing data from 
the target machine for the plaintext byte and collected 
large body of reference timing data for each instruction. 
Fig. 5 shows that encryption/decryption takes place at 
random time and it can be easily determined by the spy 
process. If data in the CPU cache is flushed dynamically 
during the encryption or decryption process, it would 
make life more difficult for the spy process, when it tries 
to collect the data for sampling purposes. In addition, no 
data in the cache implies that there is no specific place 
or point that refers to the encryption process as shown in 
Fig. 6. 
It should be noted in Fig. 6 that the graph maintains a 
uniform pattern during the entire encryption/decryption 
process. Due to this uniformity, an attacker would face 
difficulty in tracking the exact time frame when 
encryption/decryption took place. This is possible by 
flushing the CPU cache at irregular intervals. Flushing 
the cache ensures that an attacker will not get enough 
insight into the data pattern during the encryption 
process by tapping the cache data. In order to increase 
the efficiency of this approach, one can increase the 
frequency of cache flushing. This would be a 
customizable parameter in the proposed DCF 
implementation. By further analyzing the DCF 
algorithm, it would lead to more “cache-misses” than 
“cache-hits”. The “cache-misses” would eventually be 
recovered by looking up into the RAM for data. The 
“cache-misses” is the performance penalty we pay with 
this approach. But with the computing capability we 
have today with the high-end dual core CPUs, this 
refetching of data elements from the RAM, can be dealt 
with. 
It should be noted that complete cache disabling is 
also an option [3], but in such scenarios the spy process 
might as well start tapping the RAM for encrypted data.  
Flushing the cache would rather confuse the spy process 
and make life difficult for attackers to derive a fixed 
pattern of the timing information and encrypted data 
samples. 
Another feature intended in DCF algorithm is to 
 
 
 
Figure 6. AES timings, using Constant-Time AES algorithm, for 128 keys 
and 128 inputs 
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implement random delays within the execution cycles 
during the encryption/decryption process. As a matter of 
fact that if bunch of the instructions from the encryption 
program repeats more than once, the execution time for 
those instructions remain constant all the time. By 
continuously monitoring the CPU instruction cycles, 
attacker can determine the time taken to execute a step 
in encryption algorithm. Attacker might be able to 
capture the entire process timeline and data patterns 
being encrypted or decrypted. In DCF, additional delays 
could be introduced while the algorithm steps are in 
progress. This would change the encryption/decryption 
timeline and make the algorithm more unpredictable. As 
a result, attacker will not be able to guess the timing 
pattern created by the encryption/decryption steps. 
Every time when the proposed DCF algorithm 
generates a unique timing pattern for encrypting the set 
of data, it makes things more difficult for an attacker 
who uses a key parameter (i.e., the time taken to encrypt 
a set of data) in his predictable brute-force approach for 
cracking the key. The delays in DCF could be made 
more unpredictable by randomizing the numeric values 
that defines the amount of delay caused. A good sturdy 
randomizer could achieve a fairly unpredictable pattern 
of Fig. 5 Open SSL AES timings for 128 keys and 128 
inputs on a Pentium M processor and Fig. 6 AES 
timings using Constant-Time AES algorithm, for 128 
keys and 128 input delays. 
The cache timing attack exploits the effect of memory 
access on the cache, and would thus be completely 
lessened by an implementation that does not perform 
any table lookups. Instead of avoiding table lookup, one 
could employ them by ensuring that the pattern of 
accesses to the memory is completely independent of the 
data passing through the algorithm. In its easiest form, 
implementing a memory access for a relevant set of 
data, one can read all the data from the look-up table. In 
addition, one could use an alternative description of the 
cipher which replaces the table lookups by an equivalent 
series of the logical operations. For AES, this is 
particularly ideal since the lookup tables have concise 
algebraic descriptions, but performance is degraded by 
over an order of magnitude [3]. 
Flushing cache, random delays, and making data 
access independent of underlying data being processed, 
would make sense only if the DCF program is forced to 
run on a single thread. Single thread would also ensure 
that less data is being exposed to the spy process at any 
given point of time.   
B. Mathematical Model 
As discussed above, Rijndael is vulnerable to timing 
attacks due to its use of table lookups. In the current 
analysis, we develop a mathematical model for the 
attacks when table lookups are being performed during 
the execution of a Rijndael algorithm. We use our 
inventive method of flushing the cache during the 
execution of the table lookups and prove that when the 
table lookups are performed in constant-time, the 
attacker is unable to apply his/her spy process to 
recognize the encrypted data. Fig. 7 and 8 are plotted for 
constant-time DCF algorithm using a tool called 
“CacheIn” - a toolset for comprehensive Cache 
Inspection from Springer. Counter measures like 
flushing cache are implemented in the DCF algorithm 
using C++. 
Fig. 7 shows the average time taken to execute the ith 
instruction and xi0 indicates the part of the instruction 
cycle. Here, X axis shows the instruction cycle and Y 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Graph showing time taken to execute the instruction 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Graph showing time taken to collect data from cache during 
each CPU instruction. 
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axis shows the time taken to execute that particular 
instruction. Fig. 8 shows the average time taken to fetch 
the input data Pi from the cache for that particular 
instruction xi0. Here, X axis shows the data in cache 
memory and Y axis shows the time taken to fetch that 
data. Due to the constant time approach with the cache 
flushing, Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 demonstrate that an average 
time reaches to a constant value. Fig. 9 is the 
combination of the timing graphs shown in Fig. 7 and 8 
for fetching the data and the time taken to execute the 
instruction to fetch that data. 
If we take the difference of maximum values of an 
average time for fetching the data and the time to 
execute an instruction to fetch that data, we will get very 
negligible time difference, say ki. For any time 
difference between the timing data and the reference 
data, ki remains constant and too small due to cache 
flushing. This implies that, with the constant time 
information, it is not possible to determine the exact 
time taken to encrypt/decrypt the data. The performance 
of the DCF algorithm is found to be little bit slower than 
the Rijndael algorithm. The performance penalty is due 
to cache flushing that provokes the processor to search 
the missing data in the RAM or in a secondary disk. On 
the other hand, the security provided against attackers 
by the proposed DCF algorithm is pretty impressive. 
 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS 
Here is a brief description of DCF during execution of 
Rijndael algorithm. Assume that there is a huge data file 
that’s being encrypted using the DCF algorithm. The 
flowchart in Fig. 10 would portray a logical flow of 
events. A huge file is read into a user-defined variable, 
“buffer”. The password provided by the user is typically 
stored as the encryption key. Rijndael initializes itself by 
building the set of round tables and table lookups into its 
data structure which helps in processing the data in 
buffer. A timer is initialized just before Rijndael starts 
encrypting the data in the buffer. The time should be 
initialized in nanoseconds. During encryption, Rijndael 
puts the key and data together in the round operation. 
During various steps in the encryption process, the 
random delays are introduced using Sleep(X) function to 
ensure that the repeated set of instructions does not 
portray the same execution timeline. Here, the amount 
of time, the process needs to be suspended ‘X’, is 
directly proportional to the total amount of time ‘T’ 
taken to process the chunk of data of size ‘S’. If the 
timer becomes zero, flush or remove the data from the 
 
 
Figure 10. Dynamic Cache Flushing Algorithm Flowchart 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Graph showing the difference between the timing data and 
reference data 
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cache by using the cacheflush() function. The timer 
would be initialized with a random time that would 
make the encryption process time more unpredictable 
for the hacker. Reinitialize the timer with a random time 
and perform the encryption with random delay until all 
the data is processed (encrypted).  
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
We have seen that Rijndael is vulnerable to cache timing 
attack. Beyond AES, such attacks are potentially 
applicable to any implementation of a cryptographic 
algorithm that performs data-dependent memory 
accesses. The main weakness detected in the Rijndael 
algorithm is the heavy use of table lookups which 
dominate the running time and the table lookup indices. 
The countermeasures described in this paper represent a 
significant step towards developing a stable, attack-
proof AES algorithm. The DCF algorithm simulates a 
scenario wherein the table lookups are accessed in 
constant-time rather than in variable-time. This would 
disable any attacker from writing a spy program to brute 
force the key and data out of the cache data stored 
during the execution of the DCF algorithm. In the 
implementation of the DCF algorithm, cache is flushed 
periodically during encryption or decryption process. 
This would disable the attacker from tapping the cache 
for data. On the downside, there is a performance hit on 
the encryption time, but on a brighter note, the DCF 
algorithm stands strong against the cache timing attack. 
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